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OWNERSHIP RIGHTS DON’T STOP AT THE 
SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: A CALL FOR PROTECTION OF 





Intellectual property law is a fundamental doctrine founded in the 
U.S. Constitution. One manifestation of that doctrine is the Copyright 
Act, which seeks to promote creation and knowledge while protecting the 
rights of intellectual property owners. The Act fails to sufficiently 
promote these goals, however, by offering inadequate protection to the 
copyright ownership rights of undergraduate students from 
misappropriation by their universities. Undergraduate students create 
copyrightable works at greater frequencies than they create either 
patentable or trademarkable works, yet these students represent a class 
that the law seems to have overlooked.  
To justify the involuntary transfer of copyright ownership from the 
student to the school, universities may rely on the Copyright Act’s work-
for-hire doctrine or attempt to enforce their intellectual property policies 
against the students as binding contracts.  
This Note argues that universities lack the authority to usurp student 
intellectual property rights under either of these justifications. It 
provides that the work-for-hire doctrine is inapplicable because students 
are not employees and explains how contract law’s doctrines of 
consideration and unconscionability preclude the enforceability of such 
policies. This Note describes the significance of protecting student works 
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at the undergraduate level and calls for an amendment to the Copyright 
Act to expressly prohibit universities from misappropriating the 





When undergraduate student Diana Rubio found out that 
Barnes & Noble chose her backpack design drawing to represent 
the Fashion Institute of Technology (“FIT”) in the retailer’s newest 
collection, she likely did not predict that the very drawing would 
one day land her in federal court, fighting both the bookseller and 
her alma mater to regain what she believes is rightfully hers: the 
intellectual property rights to her design.1 Diana’s professor had 
told her that she and her Accessory Design classmates would earn 
thirty percent of their course grade by submitting drawings to a 
contest2 that Barnes & Noble sponsored in collaboration with FIT 
as part of its “Back to Campus Design by Students for Students 
collection.”3 What the instructor did not share with Diana, 
however, was that Barnes and Noble would produce and sell her 
“Everything Backpack” design in its stores around the world and 
that the school—not Diana—would profit from the royalties.4 This 
was especially surprising because Diana refused to sign “the rights 
and consent” form that the Chairman of the FIT Accessories 
Design Department presented to her, which would formally 
transfer all of her ownership rights to the school.5 With little more 
to show for her work than a miniscule credit on a sales tag,6 Diana 
filed a lawsuit against Barnes & Noble and FIT for copyright 
infringement and is asking the Southern District of New York to 
                                                            
1 Dareh Gregorian, Former Student Sues over Backpack She Designed for 
FIT and Was Sold at Barnes & Noble, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 18, 2014, 9:29 
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/fit-design-left-profits-lawsuit-
article-1.1908121.  
2 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at para. 9, Rubio v. Barnes & 
Noble, Inc., No. 14-CV-06561 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014), 2014 WL 4063768.  
3 Gregorian, supra note 1.  
4 Id.  
5 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 2, paras. 19–20. 
6 Id. paras. 24–26. 
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either compel royalty payments from both parties or enjoin 
indefinitely the production and sale of the “Everything 
Backpack.”7  
Undergraduate students, like Diana, will continue to suffer the 
repercussions of university usurpation of their intellectual property 
rights until Congress amends existing copyright law to protect 
student-generated copyrightable works created within the scope of 
the academic environment. The realms of copyright law reach far 
and wide to protect the works of faculty and graduate students in 
the university setting but stop short at the undergraduate level.8 In 
a world where students may have more advanced skills than their 
adult counterparts,9 and where some of the most successful 
companies are spawns of undergraduate student creation,10 the 
need for protection of intellectual property rights at this level is 
paramount. Nevertheless, the existing law leaves a gaping hole 
                                                            
7 Id. para. I. In October 2014, the District Court granted defendants’ motion 
to dismiss Rubio’s claims under the Copyright Act, reasoning that the backpack 
design was not copyrightable due to its “intrinsic utilitarian function.” Anthony 
V. Lupo & Anthony D. Peluso, Barnes & Noble Schools Former FIT Student in 
IP Suit, as Federal Court Finds Backpack Design Not Copyrightable, FASHION 
COUNSEL (Dec. 15, 2014), http://fashioncounsel.com/articles/barnes-noble-
schools-former-fit-student-ip-suit-federal-court-finds-backpack-design-not.  
8 See K.J. Nordheden & M.H. Hoeflich, Undergraduate Research & 
Intellectual Property Rights, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 34, 35 (1997) (“While 
much attention has been given to the rights of faculty and graduate students, 
little, if any, thought has been given to the rights of undergraduate students.”).  
9 TYANNA K. HERRINGTON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON CAMPUS: 
STUDENTS’ RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2010).  
10 See, e.g., Nicholas Carlson, At Last – The Full Story of How Facebook 
Was Founded, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2010, 4:10 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-was-founded-2010-3#we-can-
talk-about-that-after-i-get-all-the-basic-functionality-up-tomorrow-night-1 
(discussing how Mark Zuckerberg created Facebook while an undergraduate at 
Harvard University); Jonathan Byrnes, How Microsoft Became MICROSOFT, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2010, 1:40 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
how-did-microsoft-become-microsoft-2010-9 (describing how Bill Gates 
created Microsoft as an undergraduate student at Harvard University); Dean 
Foust, Online Extra: Fred Smith on the Birth of FedEx, BLOOMBURG BUSINESS 
(Sept. 19, 2004), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2004-09-19/online-
extra-fred-smith-on-the-birth-of-fedex (explaining how Fred Smith developed 
the idea for FedEx while an undergraduate at Yale). 
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through which the bundle of rights that lawfully belong to the 
student falls directly into the hands of the university.11 Whether 
this imbalance is due to a false general assumption that 
undergraduate students do not create copyrightable work,12 or to 
university intellectual property policies that lack both legal and 
equitable force,13 the need for a solution remains the same.  
Legislators should protect student works in order to preserve 
the very purpose and foundation of intellectual property law, which 
seeks to encourage rather than hinder creation.14 By failing to 
recognize students’ rights and thus allowing universities to reap the 
benefits of student work to the exclusion and detriment of the 
students, the law has the effect of “limit[ing] the generation and 
dissemination of knowledge, and inhibit[ing] creativity and 
inventive activity.”15 Congress should legislate to prevent 
intellectual property law from contradicting its own objectives; the 
legislative action should protect undergraduate student works and 
prevent universities from claiming ownership of such work 
through inappropriate application of copyright and contract law.  
This Note calls for legislative action to protect undergraduate 
students’ intellectual property rights from misappropriation by 
their universities. It examines existing legal doctrines that 
universities may use to defend their claims of rights to student-
generated works. It explains that universities lack authorization for 
such ownership claims under both statutory and common law. This 
Note argues instead that students are the sole owners of intellectual 
property rights to the intellectual products they create within the 
scope of their role as students. Any transfer of ownership should be 
at the election of the students with proper consideration, rather 
than at the will of the universities at which they study. 
                                                            
11 Carmenelisa Perez-Kudzma, Fiduciary Duties in Academia: An Uphill 
Battle, 48 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 491, 519 (2008).  
12 Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 35. 
13 See Sandip H. Patel, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution 
Rights in Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481, 482 (1996).  
14 See id. at 507 (“The current system of ownership rights in student-
generated inventions is inconsistent with the underlying theme of promoting the 
progress of science and useful arts.”). 
15 Id. 
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Part I will provide a brief overview of copyright law and will 
explain why undergraduate students produce works that warrant 
protection of copyright more so than any other doctrine of 
intellectual property law. Part II will explain how students may be 
deemed employees of the university under the Copyright Act or 
under common law, as explained in the context of unpaid 
internships, and will demonstrate how neither statutory nor 
common law justifies the general transfer of rights from the student 
to the school. Part III begins with an evaluation of university 
intellectual property policies and describes how universities might 
attempt to enforce these intellectual property agreements as 
binding contracts to support their claim of ownership rights to 
student work. Section III.A will introduce consideration, a 
fundamental requirement of contract law, and explain how 
university policies are unenforceable for lack of valid 
consideration. Section III.B will provide an overview of contract 
law’s doctrine of unconscionability and explain how this doctrine 
prevents the enforcement of unfair intellectual property policies. 
Section III.C will contend that university intellectual property 
policies run against public policy. Part IV will discuss why 
arguments that oppose allowing students to maintain ownership 
rights are unfounded. Finally, Part V will suggest the 
implementation of federal legislation to protect students’ rights in 
order to remain consistent with the foundations and purpose of 
intellectual property law.  
 
I. OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW  
 
The intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution states 
that “The Congress shall have Power . . . To Promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries . . . .”16 The fundamental goal of 
copyright law is to promote creation and expand knowledge.17 
Further, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the primary 
                                                            
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.  
17 See Patel, supra note 13, at 507; HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 13. 
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purpose of copyright law is for the benefit of the public.18 Unlike 
other forms of intellectual property, copyright protection attaches 
to the protectable work at the time of its creation and grants a 
number of exclusive rights in “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression.”19 These exclusive rights 
include the right to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, 
and publicly perform and display the copyrighted work.20   
Critical to the understanding and application of copyright law 
is the definition of “author.” Section 201(a) of the Copyright Act 
provides that copyright ownership “vests initially in the author or 
authors of the work[,]”21 but fails to define the term “author.”22 
The Supreme Court has defined “author” as  “he to whom anything 
owes its origin . . . .”23 As a general rule, the Court explains that an 
author is “the party who actually creates the work, that is, the 
person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression 
entitled to copyright protection.”24  
Along with authorship, a second major prerequisite for 
copyright protection is originality.25 An author may claim 
ownership over a wide variety of subject matter, including literary 
                                                            
18 See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. 
Cl. 1973) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7) (“[C]opyright 
was ‘not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of 
the public.’”), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining that the 
primary purpose of copyright is “to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of special reward, and to allow the public access to 
their genius . . . .”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (acknowledging 
the primary benefit is to the public by holding “encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors . . . .”). 
19 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2014).  
20 Id. § 106.  
21 Id. § 201(a).  
22 See id. (The statute does not expressly provide a definition for the term 
“author.”).  
23 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).   
24 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 
(1989). However, the law provides a crucial exception to this general rule with 
the work-for-hire doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). See infra Part II.A (this crucial 
exception).  
25 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  
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works, choreographies, pictorial and graphic works, photographs, 
sound recordings, and architectural works,26 yet need only 
contribute a minimal amount of creativity to the work in order to 
fulfill the originality requirement of Section 102(a).27 Where this 
requirement is met, protection continues for the duration of the life 
of the author plus an additional seventy years.28  
To put these rules into context, Diana Rubio would generally 
be deemed the author of the drawing design for the “Everything 
Backpack” since she created the idea for the original design and 
translated the idea onto paper29—a fixed, tangible expression. The 
design is original since it is a product of Diana’s own creation and 
not simply a depiction of a backpack already in existence. Further 
determination of the copyrightability of Diana Rubio’s drawing 
design is beyond the scope of this Note.30 It will suffice to say that 
                                                            
26 Id. Ideas, on the other hand, are categorically excluded from protection 
along with procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, 
principles, or discoveries. Id. § 102(b). See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 
(1879) (holding that an author of a book that communicates a system or method 
does not get the exclusive right to use of such knowledge but rather may only 
protect the way she expresses that knowledge through her language and 
organization of the book.).  
27 17 U.S.C. §102(a); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 358 (holding that the originality requirement “is not particularly 
stringent” and that “[o]riginality requires only . . . some minimal level of 
creativity.”). In his widely cited treatise on copyright law, Melville Nimmer 
explains the necessary quantum of originality to support a copyright: “[a]ny 
‘distinguishable variation’ of a prior work will constitute sufficient originality to 
support a copyright if such variation is the product of the author’s independent 
efforts, and is more than merely trivial.” Melville B. Nimmer & David 
Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B] (2004). He continues, “a work is 
original and may command copyright protection even if it is completely 
identical with a prior work, provided it was not copied from such prior work but 
is rather a product of the independent efforts of its author.” Id § 2.01[A].  
28 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).  
29 See generally Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 2 
(describing “the Drawing” as Exhibit A).  
30 Defendants Barnes & Noble and FIT filed a motion to dismiss Diana 
Rubio’s unauthorized derivative work copyright claim on grounds that the 
Everything Backpack “has an intrinsic utilitarian function, the design of which is 
not copyrightable” while citing to Section 101 of the Copyright Act, which 
excludes from protection any “useful article,” which is “an article having an 
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the 
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outside the university context of this particular case, Diana would 
be considered the author of the work and thus entitled to the full 
bundle of exclusive rights explained above, including the right to 
create derivative works,31 insofar as the work is deemed 
copyrightable.32  
Unlike copyright law, the other areas of intellectual property 
law involve demanding requirements that make it difficult for 
undergraduate students to create works that qualify for such 
protection.33 The immediacy with which copyright protection is 
granted34 and the ease with which students may satisfy the 
authorship and originality requirements make it quite easy for 
students to create copyrightable work.35 For these reasons, “more 
than any other kind of legal protection, students will encounter 
                                                            
article or to convey information.” Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 6, Rubio v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 
No. 14-CV-06561 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014), 2014 WL 5449179 (citing 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2010)). Diana Rubio responded by arguing that the defendants’ argument 
was misguided since an original work need not be copyrightable in order for a 
derivative work to constitute unauthorized infringement under the Copyright 
Act. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss the Complaint at 12–13, Rubio v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., No. 14-CV-
06561 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014). Rubio’s argument seems to be on strong 
ground as courts have repeatedly upheld contentions like hers. See, e.g., Lone 
Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722 (9th Cir. 
1984) (“Further, we have held in a copyright infringement action that it makes 
no difference that the derivation may not satisfy certain requirements for 
statutory copyright registration itself.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  
31 For a discussion of student creation of derivate works, see HERRINGTON, 
supra note 9, at 30. 
32 Note that under the work-for-hire doctrine of Section 201 of the 
Copyright Act, FIT—not Diana—would be the author of the work. The 
university may attempt to defend Diana’s infringement claim by claiming she 
was an “employee” for sake of the doctrine, but this Note will explain the 
weaknesses of such an argument in Part II.A. 
33 See Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 37. 
34 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (providing that copyright 
protection attaches from the moment of creation).  
35 See Patel, supra note 13, at 492. 
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circumstances in which their intellectual products . . . are affected 
by copyright.”36  
Patent and trademark law, on the other hand, are far less 
relevant at the undergraduate level.37 Patent law grants protection 
only to “useful”38 inventions that are “novel.”39 This means that in 
order to apply for a patent, the student would have to create an 
entirely new invention that is not known or in use by any others in 
the United States.40 Further, patent rights attach to a work only 
after the creator successfully completes the expensive and 
complicated application process with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.41 The high threshold of innovation and the 
complex application process often present too large a hurdle for 
undergraduate students to overcome.42 
Trademark law does not include stringent novelty and 
application requirements like patent law,43 but instead involves 
other difficulties that prevent this area of law from frequently 
applying to student-generated intellectual products. The federal 
trademark statute—the Lanham Act—grants trademark protection 
to “any word, name, symbol, or device . . .used . . . in 
commerce . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of 
the goods.”44 The purpose of trademark law is to protect the 
goodwill of the mark owner and prevent consumer confusion as to 
                                                            
36 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 30.  
37 See id. at 37. 
38 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).  
39 Id. § 102(a).  
40 Patel, supra note 13, at 489. 
41 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 23. 
42 See id. (“It would be the rare student who is able to patent an intellectual 
product without a partnership with a wealthy entity or individual.”).  
43 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2014). The statute defines “trademark” 
as “any word, name, symbol, or device” that is used in the market to identify the 
source. Id. Under this definition, the mark need not be new to warrant 
protection; for example, the word “apple” was already in existence at the time 
when Steve Jobs attached it to his computers. Further, the Act protects 
unregistered marks from unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) and thus 
registration is helpful, but not necessary as it is with patent law.   
44 Id. § 1127. 
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product source.45 To receive protection, a mark must “be a unique 
and distinctive identifier” of the source.46 As such, the scope of 
protection is based on consumers and the likelihood of confusion 
that may result in the marketplace from unauthorized use of a 
mark.47 Though students are capable of creating trademarkable 
works,48 the law applies less often to undergraduate students since 
they do not usually participate in commerce as manufacturers, 
sellers, or brand owners.  
The elements required for copyright protection are both 
realistic for and attainable by undergraduate students. Copyright 
law does not present the hurdles of novelty49 and commerciality50 
as do patent and trademark law. Undergraduate students like Diana 
Rubio may become authors of original, protectable works with 
minimal effort and in the normal course of their academic careers. 
Despite the fact that copyright law applies to student work more 
frequently and easily than any other doctrine of intellectual 
property law, the Copyright Act still fails to provide adequate legal 
protection for student copyrightable works against 
misappropriation by schools.51   
 
II. NEITHER STATUTORY NOR COMMON LAW AUTHORIZES 
UNIVERSITIES TO USURP STUDENTS’ INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS  
 
This section will introduce doctrines of both statutory and 
common law that a university might use to categorize students as 
employees and thus invoke the work-for-hire doctrine to support 
their claim of ownership rights. First, it will examine the Copyright 
Act’s work-for-hire doctrine and provide an example of the proper 
                                                            
45 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach 
To Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 630 (1999).  
46 See HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 20 (“The value in trademark is tied to 
the reputation and goodwill of what or whom it represents, and for the trademark 
to characterize its subject, it must be a unique and distinctive identifier.”).  
47 See Dinwoodie, supra note 45, at 630. 
48 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 20. 
49 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2014). 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2014). 
51 Perez-Kudzma, supra note 11, at 494. 
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context in which it may support university ownership. It will then 
distinguish that case from the majority of student-university 
relationships, including that of Diana Rubio and argue that, as a 
general rule, the work-for-hire doctrine does not support the 
transfer of ownership rights from the student to the school. Second, 
it will further demonstrate how the work-for-hire doctrine is 
inapplicable in the current context by examining the Department of 
Labor’s criteria for when a student may not qualify as an employee 
in the related context of unpaid internships. It will conclude that 
students are generally not employees insofar as they proceed in 
their roles as students and that the work-for-hire doctrine is 
therefore inapplicable in the present context.  
 
A. The Work-for-Hire Doctrine Does Not Apply—
Students Are Not Employees 
 
One of the main mechanisms by which schools may claim 
ownership of intellectual property rights to student-generated work 
is the work-for-hire doctrine of the Copyright Act.52 The doctrine 
allocates ownership rights to employers, rather than the employees, 
even in circumstances in which the employee generates the work.53 
Section 201(b) provides: 
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or 
other person for whom the work was prepared is 
considered the author for purposes of this title, and, 
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise 
in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of 
the rights comprised in the copyright.54  
The language of the provision provides a mechanism through 
which a university may claim ownership of student work by 
deeming itself the “author” for copyright purposes even though the 
                                                            
52 See, e.g., Fleurimond v. N.Y. Univ., 876 F. Supp. 2d 190, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 
2012).  
53 Carmen J. McCutcheon, Fairplay or Greed: Mandating University 
Responsibility Toward Student Inventors, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Oct. 2003, at 3 
(“Graduate students are often classified as staff by the university because of 
their teaching roles.”).  
54 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2014).  
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student actually produces the work.55 The work-for-hire doctrine 
will apply when two requirements are met: (1) the originator of the 
work is deemed an “employee” of the institution or university; and 
(2) the work was created within the regular “scope of 
employment.”56  
In defining whether an individual qualifies as an “employee” in 
the work-for-hire context, the Supreme Court looked at Section 
220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency in Community for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.57 The Court provided a list of 
factors to consider in the analysis, which included the manner and 
means of control over the work, the location of the work, the 
degree of skill required, the source of the resources, the method of 
payment, the extent of employee benefits, and the tax treatment of 
the hired party.58 The Second Circuit examined these factors and 
expanded the analysis further in Aymes v. Bonnelli, concluding that 
while no single factor is determinative, the factors regarding 
employee benefits and tax treatment were the most influential in 
determining whether “employee” status was appropriate.59  It is 
important to note that the highly dispositive factors—benefit plans 
and payroll taxes—are just two of the “employee” status signals 
that are missing from most student-university relationships. 
A recent university-related intellectual property dispute 
provides an example of the very specific circumstances under 
which a university may properly invoke the work-for-hire 
doctrine—and thus categorize the student as an employee—in 
order to claim ownership rights over work that the student creates. 
In Fleurimond v. New York University, the Eastern District of New 
York held that a New York University (“NYU”) student, Ariel 
Fleurimond, whom the school hired as a graphic designer through 
the Federal Work Study program,60 was an “employee” of the 
                                                            
55 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 37. 
56 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
57 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989). 
58 Id. at 751. 
59 Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).  
60 The Program provides funds for part-time employment to help needy 
students to finance the costs of postsecondary education. Federal Work-Study 
(FWS) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/ 
fws/index.html (last modified Apr. 17, 2014).  
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school and that NYU was therefore the “author” and legal owner 
of the full bundle of intellectual property rights that accompanied 
Fleurimond’s protectable work.61  
The NYU Athletics Department hired Fleurimond as an 
equipment room aide but her employment changed after the NYU 
Retails and Sales Department approached her to complete graphic 
design work for the Athletic Department.62 In her move from the 
towel room to the design lab, the terms and scope of Fleurimond’s 
employment changed; she earned a higher salary and was asked to 
complete an entirely different set of tasks.63 The subject matter that 
spawned litigation was a cat character named “Orion,” which 
Fleurimond created and designed as part of an assigned project as a 
graphic designer.64 NYU was very pleased with Fleurimond’s 
work and began using Orion on athletic team uniforms, apparel, 
promotional items, and the NYU website.65 Fleurimond then 
brought suit against NYU for copyright infringement after the 
school refused to pay her royalties for use of the Orion mascot.66  
In this case, the District Court correctly determined that NYU 
was the proper “author” of Orion because Fleurimond met the 
threshold requirements to satisfy the “employee” status under the 
work-for-hire doctrine.67 The court based its determination on the 
fact that Fleurimond received hourly monetary compensation and 
was hired for the specific purpose of creating design materials.68 
Further, the court reasoned that the relationship between 
Fleurimond, in her capacity as a graphic designer, and NYU, was 
                                                            
61 Fleurimond enrolled in New York University’s baccalaureate studies 
program in 2005 and then entered into the Federal Work Study Program in 2007. 
Fleurimond v. New York Univ, 876 F. Supp. 2d 190 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). The 
school hired Fleurimond as an athletic equipment room assistant in January of 
that year and then as a graphic designer in March. Id. at 191. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 192. The graphic design position increased Fleurimond’s salary 
from $8.00 per hour to $16.00 per hour “in recognition of the different nature 
and scope of her employment.” Id.  
64 Id. at 191.  
65 Id. at 195. 
66 Id. at 196.  
67 Id. at 200 (“[T]here is no dispute that the Plaintiff was employed as a 
graphic designer . . . .”).  
68 Id. at 199. 
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for the primary benefit of the school;69 and that the school 
maintained substantial control over the work product she created 
within the scope of her employment.70  Though these factors were 
highly dispositive in the context of Fleurimond v. NYU, they are 
absent from the majority of student-university relationships.71 The 
holding therefore is limited to the very specific facts of the case, 
where the student creates protectable work after having been hired 
for the very task of creating such work; it cannot extend beyond 
these facts into the majority of situations involving student 
protectable works.72   
The Fleurimond analysis is helpful in illustrating the stark 
contrasts between students and employees in the educational 
setting. Thus, Fleurimond supports the proposition that the work-
for-hire doctrine does not provide an adequate justification upon 
which the university may claim ownership of student intellectual 
property rights in most circumstances. The Fleurimond decision 
instructs that the relevant factors to consider in distinguishing 
students from employees include compensation, primary benefit, 
and substantial control over the work produced.73 Students are not 
compensated for attending school.74 Nor is the goal of student 
                                                            
69 Id. at 210. 
70 Id. at 202. The court conducted a thorough analysis as to whether the 
work was, in fact, completed within the scope of her employment and concluded 
in the affirmative. Id. 
71 Kathleen M. Capano et al., Comment, In re Cronyn: Can Student Theses 
Bar Patent Applications?, 18 J.C. & U.L. 105, 115 (1991) (“For most 
educational purposes . . . the student simply will be a student; the autonomy of 
the university will be preserved.”).  
72 See Patel, supra note 13, at 502 (“Courts generally hold that when the 
student creates material entitled to protection under federal intellectual property 
laws while engaged in educational or training activities . . . the student is not 
afforded the status of employee.”) (internal citations and quotation marks 
removed); see also Capano, supra note 71, at 115 (“Even when a court classifies 
a student as an employee, this classification may be limited in scope.”).  
73 See generally Fleurimond v. N.Y. Univ., 876 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199–209 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (using such factors as the student’s monetary compensation, 
specific purpose in being hired to create a new mascot for the primary benefit of 
the school, and the university’s substantial control over the work to determine 
that the student was an “employee” for purposes of the work-for-hire doctrine).  
74 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 38; see also Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra 
note 8, at 37; LisaMarie A. Collins, Copyrightable Works in the Undergraduate 
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participation in the undergraduate setting for the primary benefit of 
the university; it is rather for the enhancement of the student’s 
learning.75 Despite the fact that the university may maintain 
significant control over the methods and means by which students 
earn grades,76 such control does not itself give rise to employee 
status of the students.77 The frequency with which these factors 
apply to almost all student-university relationships leads to the 
conclusion that, by and large, “the student simply will be the 
student”78 and students will not qualify as “employees” insofar as 
they continue to act primarily in their capacity as students.79 
 
B. Students are Not Employees under Common Law’s 
Interpretation of Unpaid Internships 
 
Student participation in unpaid internships can provide a 
separate, yet related context that further demonstrates that students 
are not employees in the eyes of the law. Throughout the last three 
decades, the rate at which college students participate in 
internships in the United States has consistently been on the rise.80 
                                                            
Student Context: An Examination of the Issues, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
285, 296 (2013).  
75 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 38. 
76 Such substantial control is executed through the enforcement of course 
requirements and individual class rules, grading criteria, the enforcement of 
assignment deadlines, graduation requirements, curriculum requirements, etc.  
77 In Fleurimond, NYU’s substantial control, evidenced by its instructions 
for Fleurimond to revise her drawings several times at the Athletic Department’s 
request, was not conclusive in the court’s determination that Fleurimond was an 
employee. Fleurimond, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 201. The court instead included other 
factors in its analysis, such as compensation and the benefit of the relationship. 
Id.  
78 Capano, supra note 71, at 115. 
79 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 38. 
80 Jessica L. Curiale, Note, America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid 
Internships, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Urgent Need for Change, 61 
HASTING L.J. 1531, 1535 (2010). See also Kevin Carey, Giving Credit, but Is It 
Due?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/ 
education/edlife/internships-for-credit-merited-or-not.html (noting that interning 
has “become the norm” and that a National Association of Colleges and 
Employers survey of the graduating class of 2012 determined that a majority of 
students graduated with an internship). 
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Between the years of 1981 and 1991, the number of college 
graduates with internships jumped from one in thirty-six to one in 
three; in 2004, eighty percent of college seniors had an internship 
and the number climbed to eighty-three percent by 2008.81 The 
goal of an unpaid internship is to offer students critical 
introductory experience in their profession of choice, to boost their 
resume credentials, and to allow them to make valuable 
connections with professionals.82 Most internships do not offer 
monetary compensation83 but rather academic credit in lieu of 
payment.84 The “unpaid” status of most internships has sparked 
major controversy in recent years, where courts are penalizing 
employers who fail to pay interns who fit the legal description of 
“employees” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).85  
An article in the Notre Dame Journal of Legal Ethics and 
Public Policy discusses the issues that arise in the context of 
unpaid internships. Author David Gregory describes such 
internships as “inherently exploitative”; they benefit employers by 
providing a free workforce of individuals whose youth and 
inexperience make them vulnerable to completing “grunt work” 
and allowing the employer to gain “fresh perspectives and a means 
                                                            
81 Curiale, supra note 80, at 1535. 
82 Id. (“[I]nternships allow students to gain insight into different companies 
and perhaps make better career choices as a result.”); David L. Gregory, The 
Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 240 (1998) (explaining how student interns accept 
unpaid internships “in the hope of bolstering skills and credentialed experience 
sufficiently eventually to obtain, full-time compensated employment”); Sarah 
Braun, The Obama “Crackdown:” Another Failed Attempt to Regulate the 
Exploitation of Unpaid Internships, 41 SW. L. REV. 281, 299 (2012) (“When 
students participate in well-developed internship programs, they have the 
opportunity to develop important professional skills such as confidence, poise, 
adaptability, and the ability to work collaboratively, all of which provide crucial 
knowledge that is not necessarily taught in classroom environments.”).  
83 Curiale, supra note 80, at 1533. 
84 Gregory, supra note 82, at 241.  
85 See Susan Adams, Employers Should Pay Their Interns. Here’s Why, 
FORBES (June 9, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2014/06/09/ 
employers-should-pay-their-interns-heres-why/ (explaining that 35 suits have 
been filed against employers by unpaid interns).  
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to screen potential employees.”86 The FLSA requires payment of 
minimum wage and overtime to all individuals who qualify as 
“employees” under the statute.87  
The Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department 
of Labor provides six specific criteria that employers must meet in 
order to avoid the “employee” status of interns and thus legally 
withhold monetary payment: (1) the internship must provide 
training similar to what would be given in an educational 
environment; (2) the experience must primarily benefit the intern; 
(3) the intern must not displace regular employees; (4) the 
employer must not directly benefit from the intern’s participation 
in the program; (5) the intern must not be entitled to formal 
employment at the termination of the internship; and (6) the intern 
must not expect monetary compensation.88 This set of criteria 
seeks to ensure that the environment of the unpaid internship is as 
close to the classroom setting as possible. It logically follows that 
the law itself would not view students as employees where they 
receive educational instruction for their own benefit and do not 
expect payment, as is the case in most classroom settings.  
Therefore, a student like Diana Rubio would not be considered 
an employee of her school where she (1) created work in the 
traditional educational environment of the classroom, (2) for the 
purpose of receiving an education and earning a degree, (3) did not 
displace any employees,89 (4) did not directly benefit her university 
                                                            
86 Gregory, supra note 82, at 241; see also 2010 Internship Salary Report, 
INTERN BRIDGE 8 (2010), available at http://utsa.edu/careercenter/pdfs/ 
2010%20salary%20report.pdf (“The main purpose for-profit companies have 
historically hosted internship programs is to gain access to highly qualified 
talent at low cost . . . . [Thus,] the main assumption is that for-profit companies 
have a profit motive in the hiring of interns.”). 
87 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2014).  
88 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS 
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm (last updated Apr. 
2010).  
89 It is difficult to even consider a category of employment that would 
logically follow if such an expectation were reasonable: would students expect 
to be hired as students? That is not a typical occupation for purposes of 
receiving compensation. Any other type of employment usually associated with 
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by participating in the assignment, (5) was not entitled to 
employment at the end of the term, and (6) did not expect payment 
from such work as it was used in the academic setting.90 Rubio 
created the design at the instruction of her professor and within the 
scope of the course curriculum. The circumstances during which 
Diana Rubio created her design represent the usual setting for 
creation at the university level: a student completing course work 
in a traditional, academic setting. Thus, the conclusion that Rubio 
was not an employee at the time she created the work would apply 
to the majority of student-university contexts, thus supporting the 
notion that, in general, students are not legal employees of the 
schools they attend as they proceed in their roles as students.91 An 
exception would exist, however, where other circumstances are at 
play; where the student is employed through the Federal Work 
Study Program. In the Fleurimond case, Arielle Fleurimond was 
employed through Federal Work Study.92   
 
 
                                                            
universities would likely require additional education, such as a teacher, school 
psychologist, principal, etc.  
90 One might argue that Diana Rubio did expect compensation as evidenced 
by her suit seeking royalty payments for use of her “Everything Backpack” 
design. This argument is misguided, however, because the use in this case was 
commercial, which is not typical in the undergraduate setting. Had FIT 
displayed Diana Rubio’s drawing in a school exhibit or used it as an example for 
future students, it is not likely that Ms. Rubio would expect payment. However, 
since the drawing was used for profit, an expectation of compensation is 
reasonable. No matter how a court would determine this issue, the facts of the 
Rubio case do not apply to standard undergraduate settings that do not involve 
third-party commercialization of student work. Where no such circumstances 
exist, students do not typically expect compensation for the work they create as 
part of their course curricula and fit the other criteria set out by the Wage and 
Hour Division of the Department of Labor to prohibit their determination as 
“employees.”  
91 An exception would exist where other circumstances are at play; for 
example, where the student is employed through the Federal Work Study 
Program.  In the Fleurimond case, Arielle Fleurimond was employed through 
Federal Work Study.  See Fleurimond v. N.Y. Univ., 876 F. Supp. 2d 190 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
92 See Fleurimond, 876 F. Supp. 2d 190. 
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III. SCHOOL POLICIES ARE UNENFORCEABLE AS CONTRACTS 
 
University intellectual property policies are unenforceable as 
binding contracts. Universities may turn to their existing 
intellectual property policies to suggest a contractual agreement 
between the student and the school as the bases for their right to 
claim ownership of students’ work.93 In understanding this 
argument, it is important to first understand the context and content 
of university intellectual property policies. The World Intellectual 
Property Organization (“WIPO”)94 published a set of guidelines 
geared specifically toward universities, which instructs them on 
how to formulate intellectual property policies.95 The guidelines 
encourage policy creators to explicitly address issues such as the 
basic goals and objectives of the policy,96 coverage of persons and 
works, ownership and disclosures, and income distribution.97 
WIPO’s goal in providing the guidelines was to “safeguard” 
university interests regarding “particularly sensitive” issues, 
including those where a relationship between the school and a third 
party results in the commercialization of student-created work.98  
                                                            
93 Collins, supra note 74, at 295. 
94 WIPO is a specialized agency of the United Nations whose goal is to 
“lead the development of a balanced and effective international intellectual 
property (IP) system that enables innovation and creativity for the benefit of 
all.” Inside WIPO, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/index.html. WIPO was created in 1967 and 
currently has 188 member states. Id. 
95 See World Intell. Prop. Org., Guidelines on Developing Intellectual 
Property Policy for Universities and R&D Organization (advance copy) 
[hereinafter WIPO Guidelines], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/ 
www/uipc/en/guidelines/pdf/ip_policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
96 Id. at 4 (“The basic goal of an intellectual property policy should 
therefore be: to provide for the intellectual property generated at the institution; 
to promote the progress of science and technology; to ensure that discoveries, 
inventions and creations generated by staff and students are utilized in ways 
most likely to benefit the public.”).   
97 Id. at 5. 
98 Id. at ii. The preface of the guidelines provides that most universities are 
“amateur” in their approach to sponsorship and commercialized activities for 
lack of any intellectual property policy at all. Id. Although WIPO is correct to 
state that failing to have a policy is inadequate, this Note argues that those few 
existing university intellectual property policies are also “amateur” in how they 
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In accordance with the WIPO guidelines, most school policies 
address this situation in how they define different elements of the 
policy. These definitions address the specific subject matter that 
triggers application of the intellectual property policy; how the 
policy applies differently to faculty, staff, and students; how 
ownership rights will be distributed; and the manner in which the 
school will allocate income in the event that a student produces 
commercial work.99 One author who has focused on university 
intellectual property policies notes that an underlying sentiment of 
tension is woven through such provisions as the university 
attempts to balance the educational interests of students with the 
financial interests of the school.100 Nevertheless, universities often 
take an extensive approach to defining the materials and subject 
matter to which their intellectual property policies may extend.101 
Critical analysis of these policies is especially pertinent in 
situations involving undergraduate students and copyrightable 
works because these situations usually receive less attention than 
                                                            
address such issues as ownership. Diana Rubio’s case provides a prime example 
of how an existing intellectual property policy may be just as ineffective as no 
policy at all. This is because the policy—which specifically named the student 
as the owner of his or her work—nevertheless allowed the university to claim 
ownership of Rubio’s drawing and excluded her from the distribution of 
royalties. See Copyright Policy at Section 5(a), FASHION INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.fitnyc.edu/12428.asp (last updated Nov. 17, 2011) 
(“Subject to the other relevant terms of this Policy, students shall retain 
intellectual property ownership of works created in the course of their academic 
activities at FIT, including class work, research materials, works of art or design, 
music and theses.”).  
99 Anthony J. Luppino, Fixing A Hole: Eliminating Ownership 
Uncertainties to Facilitate University-Generated Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REV. 
367, 371 (2010). See also, e.g., Copyright Policy, FASHION INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.fitnyc.edu/12428.asp (last updated Nov. 17, 2011); 
Intellectual Property Rights, THE NEW SCHOOL, http://www.newschool.edu/ 
leadership/provost/policies/property-rights/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015); 
University Policies, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (July 1, 2012), 
http://www.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/IPPolicyFINAL.p
df .  
100 Luppino, supra note 99, at 373 (comparing the “self-conscious tension” 
to the discomfort that doctors and lawyers feel while marrying their business 
interests with the interests of the individuals they are set out to help).  
101 Id. at 374.  
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the traditional intellectual property disputes that universities face. 
The more frequent disputes occur at the graduate level because it 
traditionally incorporates sponsored research. Sponsored research 
raises ownership issues directly between the graduate students who 
create the work and the universities that fund the work because 
these relationships between the student and school more closely 
mirror the employer/employee relationship that would trigger the 
work-for-hire doctrine.102  
Many universities’ intellectual property policies state, as a 
general rule, that undergraduate students will own any intellectual 
product that they “make, discover, or create in the course of their 
research.”103 However, these same policies often carve out a 
number of exceptions that would warrant university ownership of 
student work, including when the work was sponsored or funded, 
and when the student acted as an employee, as in the Fleurimond 
case.104  It is not enough to rely on the basic language of such 
policies, however. That FIT misappropriated Diana Rubio’s rights 
                                                            
102 See id. at 375. 
103 See, e.g., WIPO Guidelines, supra note 95, at 13.  
104 WIPO’s Guidelines suggest exceptions in situations where (1) students 
receive compensation from the school in the form of wages, salary, or stipend; 
(2) the student makes significant use of the university’s resources; (3) the 
research was funded by a sponsor under a grant or sponsored research 
agreement; (4) the work involves theses or dissertations. Id at 13. Several 
schools follow this policy. See, e.g., FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra 
note 99, at 10 (stating that FIT will retain ownership of works created making 
substantial use of college resources, created as a research project sponsored by a 
governmental, corporate or other sponsor, created at the direction of or 
commissioned by FIT, closely associated with a patent owned by FIT, or created 
within the scope of an employment relationship with FIT). Parson’s New School 
includes similar exceptions.  See THE NEW SCHOOL, supra note 99, at 1–2 
(describing three exceptions to the general rule: (1) outside sponsored 
research/activities, (2) university commissioned or sponsored activities (3) 
student or faculty initiated agreements). New York University also includes 
similar exceptions. See NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, supra note 99 (describing how 
the general rule will not apply where a work is created in the course of (a) 
sponsored research (b) any research or other activity involving Substantial Use 
of University Resources (c) participation as a team member on a University 
project involving other members of the University Community (d) employment 
or other compensated duties).  
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despite an FIT policy that did not provide for such action,105 
demonstrates the potential for the inconsistent and inappropriate 
application of university intellectual policies. Furthermore, the 
schools lack legal authorization to enforce these policies as binding 
contracts.106 University policies do not carry with them the binding 
“force of law” and “cannot, in themselves, be used as valid legal 
claims on students’ intellectual products.”107  
 
A. University Intellectual Property Policies Lack 
Adequate Consideration 
 
The unenforceability of university intellectual property policies 
turns first on their lack of consideration. One of the most 
fundamental aspects of contract law is that there must be sufficient 
consideration in order for a contract to be enforceable.108 The 
Restatement of Contracts defines consideration as one of four 
things: (1) an act; (2) a forbearance; (3) the creation or 
modification of a legal relation; or (4) a return promise.109 In 
essence, consideration is a bargained-for exchange.110 Schools fail 
to meet this requirement in the transfer of rights from a student to 
the university because the school does not offer the student 
consideration.  
The first exchange between the student and the university 
occurs at the very beginning stages when the student pays tuition 
to attend the school. There is valid consideration between the 
parties in this situation, where one act is exchanged for another: the 
student pays the school in exchange for an education accomplished 
through the university’s acts of instruction and guidance. If the 
school wants to claim ownership of a student’s intellectual 
                                                            
105 See FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 99, at 10. See also 
supra note 98 for a discussion of the problem of this policy.   
106 Patel, supra note 13, at 505. 
107 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 32. 
108 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.4 (Matthew Bender & 
Co. Inc., eds., 2014) (“An informal promise without consideration that stands 
utterly alone creates no legal duty and is not enforceable. To be enforceable, 
there must be a bargained-for exchange . . . .”).  
109 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).  
110 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 108 § 5.4. 
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property rights to work the student creates through that instruction, 
it must offer the student additional consideration.111  The school 
would be correct in arguing that there is valid consideration where 
the contractual agreement is between the university and a graduate 
student or faculty member.112 In those situations, the faculty 
member or graduate student bargains for compensation as an 
employee in exchange for awarding the school ownership rights 
over his protectable work product.113 Because undergraduate 
students are not paid such compensation, this argument would fail 
in the undergraduate context. 
This argument is based on a well-founded rule of contract law 
called the pre-existing duty rule. Professor Arthur Corbin, a 
leading scholar of contract law and author of the legal treatise 
Corbin on Contracts, states the well-founded rule quite simply: 
“Neither the performance of duty nor the promise to render a 
performance already required by duty is a sufficient consideration 
for a return promise.”114 A duty arises under a number of general 
theories of obligation under contract law, including the legal 
doctrines of reliance, unjust enrichment, and tort.115 The university 
already bargained, through the initial tuition-education exchange, 
for the obligation to provide the student with an education before 
the student created any copyrightable work. Thus, tuition payments 
cannot serve as adequate consideration for the student’s 
copyrightable work after the initial exchange because the school 
had a pre-existing duty to provide that education after it accepted 
                                                            
111 Patel, supra note 13, at 505 (“Allocating the ownership rights in a 
student-generated invention absent additional consideration does not appear 
justifiable.”). The school would be correct in arguing that there is valid 
consideration where the contractual agreement is between the university and a 
graduate student or faculty member. Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 38.  
In those situations, the faculty member or graduate student bargains for 
compensation as an employee in exchange for awarding the school ownership 
rights over protectable work product. Id.  Since no such compensation is paid to 
undergraduate students, this argument would fail in the undergraduate context.  
112 Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 38.  
113 Id. 
114 ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT H. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND 
RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 87 (6th ed. 2011).  
115 Id. at 36. 
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payment.116 To comply with contract law, the university must 
therefore provide the student with additional consideration if it 
chooses to rely on its intellectual property policies as contractual 
obligations. Without such additional consideration, these policies 
are unenforceable as contracts under the pre-existing duty doctrine. 
Absent an enforceable contract whereby the student agrees to 
transfer his rights, the student will not owe the university an 
obligation to do so.  
An article published by the Kansas Journal of Law and Policy 
explains the two ways in which a university may offer the student 
such additional consideration in order to satisfy the consideration 
requirement.117 The first method is to offer the student monetary 
compensation,118 and the second is to require students to assign 
their rights to the school before allowing them to participate in any 
work that may result in the creation of copyrightable work.119 
Authors Nordheden and Hoeflich explain that the school may be 
opposed to offering payment for basic financial reasons or due to a 
separate university policy that prevents a student from receiving 
both academic credit and monetary compensation for simultaneous 
work.120 The second option would also prove futile because the act 
of conditioning a student’s participation in the learning process on 
his willingness to forego intellectual property rights would 
discourage his learning.121 According to the article, this option 
                                                            
116 Id. at 87.  
117 See generally Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 34. 
118 It is important to note that the compensation offered must be fair in light 
of the circumstances of the particular situation. The Second Restatement of 
Contracts provides that “a false recital of consideration” or consideration that is 
“merely nominal” will not suffice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
71 cmt.b (1979).  
119 Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 38. In this situation, the school 
would offer the student permission to participate in the educational setting that 
would induce production of protectable works in exchange for the student’s 
agreement to transfer ownership rights to the school. Permission is granted in 
exchange for agreement and consideration is satisfied.  
120 Id. at 38–39. 
121 See, e.g., id. at 38–39; Patel, supra note 13, at 504 (“If . . . the student 
and her determination to maximize her creative potential become inhibited, 
society would miss out on the prompt disclosure of the student’s idea.”).  
 OWNERSHIP RIGHTS FOR STUDENTS 827 
would be “antithetical to the educational mission of the university 
and highly exploitative of undergraduate labor.”122  
Aside from monetary compensation or preconditioned 
agreements, a university may argue that course credit may serve as 
adequate compensation for purposes of satisfying the requirements 
of contract law and enforcing its intellectual property policies. The 
major flaw of this argument is that it falls directly within the 
realms of the aforementioned pre-existing duty doctrine. The 
analysis of this issue turns to the context of unpaid internships 
discussed in Part III.B of this Note. In the Notre Dame article, 
Gregory discusses the ineffectiveness of a university’s use of 
academic credit as currency.123 Gregory explains that academic 
credit cannot constitute compensation in the unpaid internship 
setting since students are the ones paying the school for that 
academic credit.124 Once again, the university would be attempting 
to “double-dip” into the pot of student-generated funds in order to 
enforce its intellectual property policies without additional 
consideration. The pre-existing duty doctrine bars this action and 
thus prevents academic credit from serving as sufficient 
compensation under contract law.125  
                                                            
122 Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 39. Nordheden and Hoeflich 
also explain that regardless of such a policy argument, the law on adhesion 
contracts (those that favor one party over the other on a “take it or leave it” 
basis) would likely deem this agreement unenforceable. Id. See infra Part.III, for 
a thorough analysis as to how this option would lay contradictory to the 
underlying purposes of Copyright law.  
123 Gregory, supra note 82, at 227. 
124 Id. at 260 (“[T]he school gets paid, not to teach, but simply to put 
credits on transcripts.”). Gregory argues that, in essence, all the school is doing 
in exchange for the thousands of dollars students pay per credit is providing a 
letter on paper, since the employer is actually the entity providing the instruction 
and occupational education to the student. Id.  
125 The pre-existing duty rule is one “corollary” of the doctrine of 
consideration that judges apply to contract issues with a “frequency unmatched” 
by any other (others include illusory promises and mutual obligation). Mark B. 
Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of 
Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 713, 730 (1996). Stated simply, the 
rule provides that “[p]romising to perform, or performing, an act that one is 
already under a legal duty to perform, is not consideration for a return promise.” 
Id. at 730.  
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Even where the pre-existing duty doctrine does not apply,126 
the argument that academic credit may serve as a form of payment 
to students remains flawed. Federal regulators deem school credit 
an illegitimate tool in satisfying compensation requirements, 
“especially when the internship . . . mainly benefits the 
employer.”127 Since academic credit is an insufficient replacement 
for monetary compensation where students participate in unpaid 
internships that serve the needs of the employer, it logically 
follows that regulators would similarly deem credit inadequate 
where students complete coursework for the financial benefit of 
only the school. 
Regardless of which argument a university may raise in 
defense of its existing intellectual property policies, the policies 
will continue to lack the requisite additional consideration to claim 
ownership of student intellectual property rights as long as the 
university fails to provide the student with monetary 
compensation.  
 
B. University Intellectual Property Policies are 
Unconscionable  
 
An intellectual property policy that fails to offer students 
compensation before transferring rights to the school is also 
unenforceable under contract law’s policing doctrine of 
unconscionability. Courts use the principle of unconscionability to 
strike down extremely unfair or oppressive contracts.128 
                                                            
126 For purposes of argument and clarity, this Note will proceed under the 
false assumption that the pre-existing duty doctrine does not, in fact, apply to the 
circumstance. 
127 Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/business/03intern.html (“[F]ederal 
regulators say that receiving college credit does not necessarily free companies 
from paying interns.”). Greenhouse includes as regulators officials in Oregon, 
California, and other states who are investigating employers who facilitate 
unpaid internships, as well as the U.S. Department of Labor. Id.  
128 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
unconscionability as “[t]he principle that a court may refuse to enforce a 
contract that is unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during 
contract formation or because of overreaching contractual terms, esp. terms that 
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Traditionally, courts were only able to invalidate inequitable 
contracts by employing other policies of contract law, such as 
insufficient consideration or duress.129 However, when the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) codified the unconscionability 
doctrine in 1952, modern courts gained access to a statutory 
foundation upon which to rely when dealing with unfair 
agreements.130 Although the UCC applies exclusively to sale of 
goods contracts, Section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts adopted the concept of unconscionability in 1981 and 
has since carried the doctrine across the boundaries of sale of 
goods cases and into general contract law.131  
Issues of unconscionability arise where an agreement involves 
“an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties 
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to 
the other party.”132 Courts generally recognize two forms of 
unconscionability and require that both be present before striking 
down a contract as unenforceable.133 Procedural unconscionability 
relates to the problems that occur during the contract-making 
process and produce coercive or “unfairly surprising” 
agreements.134 Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand, 
pertains to defects in the resulting agreements.135   
                                                            
are unreasonably favorable to one party while precluding meaningful choice for 
the other party.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1979). 
129 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.2 (2011). 
130 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1952).  
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).  
132 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965).  
133 See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The 
Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967). But see, Melissa T. 
Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism – The Sliding Scale 
Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2012). Lonegrass 
describes a trend among state supreme courts to replace the hard and fast rule, 
which requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability with a sliding 
scale approach, which allows for courts to strike down a contract for 
unconscionability where expansive evidence of one category compensates for 
limited evidence of the other. Id. Five courts have taken the sliding scale one 
step further in finding unconscionability where only one category is present. Id.  
134 Leff, supra note 133, at 498. 
135 Id. 
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1. Procedural Unconscionability—Students are 
Unfairly Surprised and Lack Choice 
 
Procedural unconscionability occurs where either the terms of 
an agreement unfairly surprise a party or where a party lacks 
meaningful choice in its decision to enter into the agreement.136 
The policy behind procedural unconscionability proceeds on the 
ground that a party must fully understand the terms he is agreeing 
to, in terms of both comprehension and acknowledgement,137 and 
must also be in a position to negotiate those terms in his own best 
interest. The student-university context provides a fine example of 
procedural unconscionability: students fail to understand the terms 
of the agreements they enter into because (1) they are unaware of 
the existence of intellectual property policies in the first place; (2) 
they lack the capacity to fully understand the terms of the policies 
when they are aware; and (3) they lack the standing and bargaining 
position to negotiate those terms in their own best interests.  
The first element of procedural unconscionability, unfair 
surprise, is present either where a contracting party lacks 
sophistication or where a contract’s terms are inconspicuous.138 
Though students do not represent the class of individuals that 
courts generally recognize as unsophisticated,139 intellectual 
property policies nevertheless unfairly surprise undergraduate 
students because the terms are inconspicuous. Schools generally do 
not call the students’ attention toward their intellectual property 
policies140 but instead bury them deep within the university’s 
                                                            
136 Kendall K. Johnson, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of 
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete, 19 SPORTS L. J. 1, 16 
(2012).  
137 Id. One must both realize that he is agreeing to adhere to some term and 
also comprehend the meaning and effect of that term. Id.  
138 Id. at 16–17. 
139 See, e.g., Ryan v. Weiner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Del. 1992) (holding 
that the court should consider the vulnerability and unsophistication of the 69 
year-old plaintiff with a ninth grade education in determining whether the 
contract at hand was procedurally unconscionable). 
140 See Patel, supra note 13, at 503–04. 
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general set of policies.141 While deciding whether to accept 
enrollment into a university, students are often most focused on the 
school’s degree programs, course offerings, and various elements 
of campus life.142 Close to the bottom of that list, if at all, would be 
the school’s policy on intellectual property rights.143 Often, 
students do not seek out these policies until long after enrollment 
and only after the student has already created protectable work,144 
as was the case with Diana Rubio. Under the current state of the 
law, it is too late for the student to raise concerns or object to the 
policy’s terms at that point since she already (inadvertently) signed 
away her rights by enrolling in the school.  
University intellectual property policies are procedurally 
unconscionable not simply because the students fail to read them, 
but rather because the students do not recognize them as binding 
contracts. While courts generally hold that parties are bound by a 
contract whether they have read it or not, they recognize an 
exception where the writing does not appear to be a contract and 
                                                            
141 For example, while trying to locate the intellectual property policy of 
New York University, I had to first visit the school’s general website and then 
click onto its designated policy page. From there, I had to search among several 
categorical tabs such as “Financial Affairs”, “Governance & Legal”, 
“Information Technology”, “Operations & Safety”, “Research”, and “Student 
Affairs” and the dozens of policies listed under each tab, and I had to search 
through each tab, using only my own logical reasoning as a guide, to understand 
each before finally coming across the school’s “Statement of Policy on 
Intellectual Property.” It is difficult to imagine how likely a prospective NYU 
student would be to conduct such a search and locate the document successfully 
where it took an individual who was specifically seeking out such information 
more time and effort than a simple point and click. University Policies and 
Guidelines, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, http://www.nyu.edu/about/policies-
guidelines-compliance/policies-and-guidelines/academic-affairs-faculty-
policies.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).  
142 See Patel, supra note 13, at 503 (“Students choosing universities . . . 
base their decisions upon the congruence between personal interests and the 
substance of the . . . program.”).  
143 See id. at 503–04; Perez-Kudzma, supra note 11, at 499 (“Even though 
intellectual property policies are prominent in academia, some universities fail 
to notify students of their policies. Therefore, students may engage in research 
activities at universities without knowing the extent of their intellectual property 
rights.”).  
144 See Patel, supra note 13, at 504. 
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the party that created it does not call the agreeing party’s special 
attention to the contract terms.145 The present situation provides an 
appropriate context for invoking this exception since students are 
not likely to understand that a school policy is an enforceable legal 
contract, or that choosing to enroll in the school serves as assent to 
all of the provisions of such policies. The policies do not have 
signature lines, are not presented as formal documents with 
counsel present, and do not expressly call themselves “contracts” 
or even “agreements.”146 It is unlikely that a student, likely fresh 
out of high school, would recognize a school policy as an 
enforceable contract to which he is legally bound. Further, as 
explained above, universities generally do not make the effort to 
call their intellectual property policies to their students’ special 
attention so that students may acknowledge them.147 Such lack of 
notice and understanding demonstrates how unfairly surprising, 
and thus procedurally unconscionable, these intellectual property 
policies are to students. 
The second element that demonstrates procedural 
unconscionability is lack of meaningful choice. In the event that a 
university does call special attention to its intellectual property 
policy, a policy that would allow for the transfer of students’ rights 
to the school absent adequate consideration would nonetheless be 
invalid since undergraduate students lack meaningful choice while 
agreeing to the school’s intellectual property policy. A party lacks 
meaningful choice where “an inequality of bargaining power 
results in ‘no real negotiation’ and the weaker party is virtually 
coerced into accepting the other party’s terms.”148 Courts will hold 
                                                            
145 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29–30 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (holding that “a consumer’s clicking on a ‘download’ button does not 
communicate assent to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to the 
consumer that clicking on the button would signify assent to the terms”). The 
Specht court held that under California common law, a contract is unenforceable 
where the agreement does not appear to be a contract and the terms are not 
called to the recipient’s attention. Id.  
146 See supra notes 98 and 104 (discussing the policies of certain 
universities).  The polices discussed in those footnotes provide lucid examples 
of the deficiencies of existing university policies.  
147 Perez-Kudzma, supra note 11, at 499. 
148 Johnson, supra note 136, at 17 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
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a contract unenforceable where the weaker position of one party 
impedes his ability to negotiate and effectively coerces him into 
agreeing to a contract.149 Universities do not participate in 
negotiations with individual students regarding their policies but 
rather offer the policies on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis.150 Under 
contract law, such agreements are known as contracts of 
“adhesion.”151 Adhesion contracts lend themselves to 
unconscionability by definition, since they usually involve the 
reluctant agreement of one party despite his dissatisfaction with the 
terms.152  
Adhesion contracts are particularly troublesome where they 
position inexperienced and eager students against established 
institutions. A student who seeks to attend a school like Harvard 
due to its prestige, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for 
its excellence in applied sciences and mathematics, or FIT to learn 
from fashion industry professionals, will almost always choose the 
“take it” option, despite unfavorable terms.153 It is difficult to 
imagine how egregious policy terms would have to be in order to 
provoke a student like Diana Rubio, who dreams of a career in 
fashion design, to turn down an admissions offer from FIT, the 
“premier institution for fashion and related professions.”154  
Not only do students lack meaningful choice based on their 
inability to negotiate, they also lack the ability to assent due to 
their inferior bargaining power. A young, inexperienced student 
has little power to negotiate with an educational institution like a 
                                                            
149 Leff, supra note 133, at 498. 
150 See HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 46–47; Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra 
note 8, at 35. 
151 HERRINGTON, supra note 9, at 46–47.  
152 Black’s defines adhesion contracts as “standard-
form contract[s] prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a 
weaker position, usually a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little 
choice about the terms.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
153 See Patel, supra note 13, at 503 (explaining how a student may consider 
a school’s concentration in “chemical kinetics” over another’s in 
“thermodynamics” while making an enrollment decision).  
154 Fashion Institute of Technology, U.S. NEWS EDUCATION, 
http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/fit-2866 (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2015).  
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university.155 While the student represents but one applicant among 
a sea of thousands from which the university may choose in 
making offers of admission,156 the student usually has a smaller 
pool of schools from which to choose, based first on admissions 
offers and then on the student’s primary concerns such as his 
educational and financial needs.157 The difference in size between 
the pool of college applicants and the pool of schools offering 
admission helps demonstrate the magnitude of the difference in 
bargaining power that weighs heavily in favor of the university. 
The university’s undoubtedly superior sophistication and level 
of familiarity with the terms and consequences of its policies 
further contribute to its heightened bargaining power.158  
Undergraduate students are not in the business of maintaining 
educational institutions, nor are they likely to be familiar with 
intellectual property law. Students lack familiarity with a 
university’s policies,159 as well as the foresight and financial means 
to seek legal counsel before agreeing to them.160 The obvious 
disparity in size between the institution and the student also 
demonstrates the inequality in bargaining power.  Universities 
typically do not take certain actions that would mitigate the effects 
of the size difference,161 such as taking the initiative to explain to 
the student the key provisions or drawing attention toward them 
with conspicuous type.162 Differences in size therefore play a much 
                                                            
155 See Patel, supra note 13, at 504 (“To say that the university enjoys a 
superior bargaining position would be an understatement.”).  
156 See Delece Smith-Barrow, 10 Universities That Receive the Most 
Applications, U.S. NEWS (Jul. 15, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
education/best-colleges/the-short-list-college/articles/2014/07/15/10-
universities-that-receive-the-most-applications. According to U.S. News, the ten 
universities that received the most applications in the country received anywhere 
from 47,000 to 72,000 applications from first-time students in the fall semester 
of 2012 alone. Id.  
157 See Identify Important Factors in Choosing a College, THE ACT, 
http://www.actstudent.org/college/factors.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).  
158 See Johnson, supra note 136, at 20. 
159 As explained above, this lack of familiarity may be a lack of awareness 
entirely.  
160 See Luppino, supra note 99, at 417.  
161 Patel, supra note 13, at 503–04. 
162 See Johnson, supra note 136, at 20. 
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larger role in the unconscionability analysis. When coupled with 
the other issues of unfair surprise and lack of meaningful choice, 
the case for procedural unconscionability falls in favor of the 
student.  
 
2. Substantive Unconscionability—The Policies 
are One-sided and Unfair 
 
Substantive unconscionability turns on the fairness of the final 
contract. The analysis is not based on the parties involved or the 
context under which the terms were agreed upon. Instead, it 
focuses on determining whether the single agreement at issue163 
contains terms that are one-sided and extremely unfair.164 A court 
will strike down a contract as substantively unconscionable where 
the agreement is both unreasonable and so “‘harsh’ or ‘oppressive’ 
in nature, or the terms so one-sided as to ‘shock the 
conscience.’”165 FIT’s intellectual property policy presents an 
example of an agreement that is so one-sided that it “shocks the 
conscience.” On one side of the agreement is FIT, a state-funded 
institution that educates 10,000 students per academic year.166 
With the support of its intellectual property policy, FIT may claim 
ownership of undergraduate students’ intellectual property rights—
as in the case of Diana Rubio—which then allows the school to 
collect royalties from sales of the Everything Backpack.167 Diana 
Rubio, the aspiring young designer,168 sits on the opposite side of 
the contract from FIT, where she is excluded from sharing in the 
profits from for her work.169 A policy like FIT’s, which allows a 
university to reap the fruits of its student’s labor while excluding 
that student from the financial benefit “shocks the conscience” and 
provides cause for a finding of substantive unconscionability.  
                                                            
163 Leff, supra note 133, at 498. 
164 Lonegrass, supra note 133, at 11. 
165 Id. (quoting 1 Linda J. Rusch, Hawkland UCC Series § 2:302:5 (2010)).  
166 Our History, FASHION INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 
http://www.fitnyc.edu/1807.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).  
167 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 2, para. 28. 
168 Id. para. 64. 
169 Id. para. 26. 
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Where a university relies on its intellectual property policies as 
binding contracts to usurp ownership rights of student-generated 
work, it violates basic principles of contract law that call for 
equality and fairness. The agreements are procedurally 
unconscionable because students lack notice, understanding, and 
bargaining power; and substantively unconscionable because their 
terms are shockingly one-sided and unfair to students. As such, 
even if courts deem these policies enforceable despite a lack of 
consideration, they would likely strike them down under the 
doctrine of unconscionability.  
 
C. The Enforcement of These Intellectual Property 
Policies Runs Against Public Policy 
 
Intellectual property policies that allow universities to claim 
ownership of students’ protectable works not only violate contract 
law, but also run fiercely against long-standing principles of public 
policy. Courts generally define public policy as “the present 
concept of public welfare or general good . . . .”170 Public policy 
serves as a policing doctrine through which courts protect public 
interests from agreements that may be offensive or in conflict with 
such interests.171 Agreements that run against policy will likely see 
the same fate as those that are unconscionable—courts will strike 
them down as unenforceable.172  
Like the unconscionability doctrine, the concept of public 
policy involves both procedural and substantive components.173 
However, the first step in the public policy analysis is not to decide 
whether the agreement in question is procedurally or substantively 
                                                            
170 Grace McLane Giesel, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 14 (Joseph M. Perillo 
ed., Vol. 15 2003) (citing Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 214 
Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d at 5).  
171 Id. at 2. 
172 Id. at 1. 
173 Id. at 6–7. A contract that is procedurally contrary to public policy is 
one that conflicts solely due to the fact that the contract is consummated on a 
day of the week where a law prohibits contracting on that specific day. Id. A 
contract that is substantively contrary to public policy is one that involves a 
performance that in itself would conflict with public policy, such as contracting 
for illegal activity. Id.  
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in conflict with public policy.174 Instead, it is to first determine 
whether a public policy exists regarding the format or substance of 
the agreement in the first place.175 Constitutions, statutes, and 
common law all contribute to what constitutes “public policy,” 
though courts have failed to provide a clear definition of the 
concept.176 Suffice it to say that public policy is a term that 
envelops the interests, values, and morals of the general public that 
are of such importance as to warrant legislative and judicial 
protection.177  
The very language and purpose of the Intellectual Property 
Clause in the U.S. Constitution serves as strong evidence that the 
promotion of learning and creation stands at the forefront of public 
policy. As explained in Part I of this Note, the Clause was meant to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts in order to 
expand knowledge for the ultimate benefit of the public.178 
Intellectual property policies that allocate student ownership rights 
to the school have the opposite effect, however.179 These policies 
hinder creativity because students are less likely to create 
protectable work when they are faced with the threat of losing their 
rights.180 Carmenelisa Perez-Kudzma, a professor of law who has 
focused on intellectual property law, writes, “[s]tudents will not 
feel confident in exploring their intellectual potential if they fear 
losing their intellectual property to those they trust.”181 Through 
the use of such policies, the university “fails in its mission to 
                                                            
174 See id.  
175 See id. 
176 Id. at 14.  
177 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “public policy” as: “principles and 
standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental 
concern to the state and the whole of society.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th 
ed. 2009).  
178 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8. 
179 See Patel, supra note 13, at 507. 
180 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 74, at 302 (“[I]nforming students that they 
may not maintain ownership in their own works may hamper their enthusiasm 
for developing works that reach their full creative potential.”).  
181 Perez-Kudzma, supra note 11, at 518. 
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encourage the generation and dissemination of knowledge for the 
benefit of the university community and society as a whole.”182 
The continued enforcement of intellectual property policies 
that allow for this transfer of student rights would have further 
consequences that harm society. Where a university expressly 
gives students notice of its policy to seize ownership rights to 
protectable work, a student will likely proceed in either of two 
ways. The first would be the outright decision to seek an education 
elsewhere. This resolution is detrimental to the student because it 
impedes his ability to choose a school based on more important 
factors such as degree programs and campus life.183 Furthermore, it 
is unlikely that the student would even be able to locate a school 
that has a more protective policy, and the student will have wasted 
time, money, and effort in the unsuccessful search.184 The second 
potential consequence of enforcing these intellectual property 
policies is that the student will simply choose to abstain from any 
coursework that has the potential to yield protectable works.185 
This turns back to the issue of hindering creation as described 
above, which negatively affects both society, by prohibiting the 
student’s idea from ever entering the public purview, and the 
student, by stunting his learning, and forcing him to decide 
between relinquishing his rights or harming his course grade by 
refusing to complete the work.186   
Intellectual property policies that facilitate the transfer of 
ownership rights from the undergraduate student to the school 
absent compensation have both immediate and lasting effects that 
disturb public policy. These policies run against the constitutional 
foundations of intellectual property law by diminishing a student’s 
incentive to create and preventing the expansion of knowledge.  
 
 
                                                            
182 Patel, supra note 13, at 504. 
183 See Identify Important Factors in Choosing a College, THE ACT, 
http://www.actstudent.org/college/factors.html  (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).  
184 Patel, supra note 13, at 504. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. 
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IV. THE BENEFITS OF ALLOCATING RIGHTS TO THE STUDENT 
OUTWEIGH CONTRARY CONCERNS  
 
The benefits of student ownership of intellectual property 
rights far outweigh any concerns. One issue turns on whether or 
not the students are qualified to take on the responsibility that 
comes with the ownership of these rights.187 That existing law does 
not enforce an age requirement for authors of protectable works 
weakens this contention dramatically. If the writers of the 
Constitution did not find it worrisome that intellectual property 
rights may develop with young authors, and since Congress has yet 
to amend the law to prohibit such authors from receiving 
protection, it is hard to find reason for such worry in the present 
context.  
Another argument against student retention of copyright 
ownership is that it would place a target on the backs of student 
creators and make them vulnerable to manipulation by intellectual 
property firms.188 This argument ignores the fact that these 
students are just as defenseless against professional brokers as they 
are against the universities they attend. Diana Rubio was exploited 
not by an overzealous copyright scout who sold her a wild dream, 
but rather by the university she trusted. Instead of attempting to 
protect students from mistreatment by outside parties, universities 
should first examine their own intellectual property policies to 
make sure they do not promote such exploitation.  
 
V. SOLUTION: A CALL FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PROTECT 
STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 
 
Congress should legislate to protect the intellectual property 
rights of undergraduate students from misappropriation by their 
universities. Despite ample support from the Constitution, contract 
law, and public policy, the system of copyright law as it exists 
                                                            
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 510 (“Universities may take a paternalistic view that students will 
render themselves vulnerable to unscrupulous brokers who will take advantage 
of the students.”). This suggests that intellectual property brokers might attempt 
to capitalize on the youth and naïvety of undergraduate students by making 
unfavorable offers for the transfer of their rights.  
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today fails to adequately protect undergraduate students. 
Arguments against invoking such protection are without merit and 
fail to overcome the abundant and compelling reasons that support 
student ownership. Though Diana Rubio’s case presents but one 
example of this problem, the risk of similar issues occurring is far 
from trivial.189  
Undergraduate students will continue to create copyrightable 
works for as long as the Copyright Act awards their works 
protection since creation of protectable works occurs regularly 
throughout the education process.190 And as long as courts 
continue to enforce policies like that of FIT, the potential for 
misappropriation of student rights will continue to burden the 
educational system. University policies, without good reason, fail 
to provide an equitable approach to the distribution of intellectual 
property rights.191 As such, Congress should be proactive in 
initiating uniform and fair standards by which all students and 
universities must adhere.  
An amendment to the Copyright Act that would expressly 
prevent a university from claiming ownership of intellectual 
property rights to protectable student-generated work would 
successfully achieve that goal. A relatively minor amendment to 
Section 201 of the Copyright Act would provide the necessary 
protection to undergraduate students. As referenced earlier in this 
Note, Section 201 describes the different forms of copyright 
ownership, such as initial ownership and works made for hire.192 It 
explains that copyright ownership may be transferred and describes 
how the law will “not give effect” to any transfer that is 
“involuntary.”193 Section 201(e) provides:  
When an individual author’s ownership of a 
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a 
                                                            
189 Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 37 (“[T]he risk of 
undergraduate researchers making claims to rights in the fruits of their labors is 
not negligible, particularly in computer science and other types of research 
where even young researchers may well be able to do significant work.”). 
190 See Part I infra for a discussion on the qualities of copyright law that 
make it more feasible for undergraduate students to create copyrightable works.  
191 Luppino, supra note 99, at 425. 
192 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2014). 
193 Id. § 201(e) . 
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copyright, has not previously been transferred 
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by 
any governmental body or other official or 
organization purporting to seize, expropriate, 
transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with 
respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive 
rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under 
this title, except as provided under title 11.194 
Congress should amend the language of Section 201(e) to 
expressly include universities so as to prevent the involuntary 
transfer of rights from the students to their respective schools. An 
effective amendment might read as follows: 
When an individual author’s ownership of a 
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a 
copyright, has not previously been transferred 
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by 
any governmental body or other official or 
organization, including a university, purporting to 
seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of 
ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of 
the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be 
given effect under this title, except as provided 
under title 11.195 
Proper exceptions will, of course, apply in situations where the 
work-for-hire doctrine is appropriate, as in the Fleurimond case, or 
where the university offers the student adequate compensation. 
The amount of payment should be fair in light of the 
circumstances; as one author puts it: “Nominal payments will not 
do.”196  
The unambiguous inclusion of universities in the “Involuntary 
Transfer” provision of the Copyright Act would eliminate the 
potential for universities to create loophole justifications for the 
transfer based on unenforceable contracts or a faulty application of 
the work-for-hire doctrine. Unlike the terms of university 
                                                            
194 Id. Title 11 of the United States Code is entitled “Bankruptcy.” 11 
U.S.C. (2000). 
195 Id.  
196 Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 38. 
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intellectual property policies, which may be inconspicuous to 
students,197 the suggested amendment to the Copyright Act is a 
clear and obvious recognition of the fact that a university may not 
seize intellectual property ownership rights. In the event that a 
situation like that of Diana Rubio were to occur under such 
legislation, the student would be able to rely not only on the strong 
arguments regarding copyright and contract law discussed earlier 
in this Note, but would also be able to point directly to the 
Constitution in order to support her position and protect her rights. 
That FIT is able to claim ownership of Diana Rubio’s ownership 
rights demonstrates the need for more clear-cut protection of 
undergraduate students’ rights. Where the Constitution expressly 
includes a university amongst those institutions that may not seize 
“an individual’s ownership of a copyright”, a university like FIT 
would have little, if any, defense for such action.  
The amendment above would provide students with a 
comforting blanket of protection that would encourage their 
creativity and foster learning in an environment where such 
activities are of paramount importance. It would create a safety net 
upon which undergraduate students may rely in addition to the 
more basic principles of copyright and contract law, which provide 
further, though less express, protections. Such legislation would 
help realize the true missions of intellectual property law by 




The Constitution addresses some of the most fundamental 
concepts upon which this nation was established. The intellectual 
property clause expresses one of these concepts through its 
dedication to the promotion of knowledge and creation. A concept 
that is so deeply rooted in American history deserves the utmost 
respect and attention, especially as it pertains to society’s growing 
class of academics. Undergraduate students represent one of the 
                                                            
197 See Part III.B of this Note for a discussion of unconscionability and 
inconspicuous contract terms as they relate to university intellectual property 
policies.  
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few classes that may challenge the university for ownership rights: 
where the work-for-hire doctrine precludes both graduate students 
who participate in sponsored research and professors who qualify 
as employees from contesting the transfer of rights, undergraduate 
students may rely on contract law to bolster their claims.198 Despite 
this support, undergraduate students’ rights are among the least 
protected in the university context.199  
The need for protection is even more significant in light of the 
fact that universities lack legal and equitable standing to claim 
ownership of student protectable works. The work-for-hire 
doctrine of the Copyright Act is inapplicable in circumstances 
where students act solely in their capacity as students. The 
intellectual property policies that might facilitate the transfer of 
ownership to such works are unenforceable contracts because they 
do not satisfy contract law’s fundamental requirement of 
consideration and violate its policing doctrines of 
unconscionability and public policy. 
Legislators should change existing law, which enables the 
exploitation of students like Diana Rubio. By passing a legislative 
act that expressly prevents the transfer of intellectual property 
rights from the student to the university absent appropriate 
compensation, Congress would both provide students with much-
deserved protection and uphold the constitutional goal of 
promoting the expansion of knowledge. 
 
                                                            
198 Nordheden & Hoeflich, supra note 8, at 37. 
199 See Perez-Kudzma, supra note 11, at 519. 
